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In this study, we find that non-merger rival banks of failed banks from 2008 to 2013 experience substantial negative 
abnormal stock returns in the US when failed banks are auctioned. Negative abnormal returns are related to contagion 
effects associated with an increased probability of their own failure and the information of these rival banks’ opaque 
assets. We also find evidence that FDIC resolutions of these failed banks, similar to previous regulatory interventions, 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis witnessed a large number of commercial and saving bank failures in 
the United States. In total, 489 banks failed between 2008 and 2013 before the upward trend finally 
decelerated. Nearly 95% of these failed banks were auctioned successfully to healthy banks by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). These auctions are also known as purchase and 
assumption transactions (P&As) as the acquirer is required to purchase a failed bank’s assets and 
assume its deposits. Despite the importance of these failed bank resolutions during the recent 
financial crisis, little is known about their intra-industry effects. 
This paper examines the effects of failed-bank acquisition announcements on the stock prices 
of non-merger rival banks that operate in the same banking markets. The results show that 
stockholders lose significant negative value from the acquisitions, with a -0.45% average two-day 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). We find evidence of contagion effects that the negative 
revaluations are higher when rival banks are located in the markets with a higher occurrence of 
bank failures. This likely reflects an increased probability of their own failure. Further analyses 
show that the contagion effects could also be attributed to information about rival banks’ exposure 
to real estate lending, which was under greater market scrutiny after the outbreak of housing market 
crash in 2007. Our tests also show that the losses to rival banks’ stockholders are driven by 
significant wealth transfers from the FDIC to the acquirers as well as pre-merger regulatory 
interventions such as TARP. These measures may place the rival banks at a competitive 
disadvantage and therefore cause the market value of rival banks to decline.  
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is most directly related to the bank 
failure literature. Many of the early US studies focus on the failures of large banks to examine 
whether the adverse effects spread to other banks (Pettway, 1976; Lamy and Thompson, 1986; 
Swary, 1986; Aharony and Swary, 1996). This sampling approach, however, ignores a greater 
number of other publicized bank failures during the same period and are unable to examine 
whether negative intra-industry effects may vary across failed-banks announcements (Akhigbe and 
Madura, 2001). Another strand of literature mainly focuses on the effects of P&A announcements 
on FDIC auction winners’ stockholder value. These studies tend to find a positive average bidder 
stock-price reaction to acquisition announcements associated with wealth transfers from the 
government agency resolving the failure (James and Wier, 1987; Bertin et al., 1989; Baibirer et 
al., 1992; Cochran et al., 1995; Zhang, 1997; Cowan and Salotti, 2015). A few other empirical 
studies, however, use different approaches to examine the FDIC auction process. For example, 
James (1991) focuses on losses realized in bank failures in the 1980s. The author finds that these 
losses appear to vary with the resolution methods used by the FDIC. More specifically, there is a 
significant going-concern value that is preserved when a failed bank is auctioned but that is lost if 
the bank is liquidated. Granja (2013), on the other hand, finds that when failed banks are subject 
to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing the bank 
and retain a lower portion of its assets. Granja et al., (2017) examine the allocation process of 
failed bank sales between 2007 and 2013. They find that failed banks tend to be sold to bidders 
within the same market and with similar business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. 
With the liquidity/budget constraint experienced by most banks in a systemic financial crisis, the 
allocation process of failed bank assets, nevertheless, may be inefficient, which partially explains 
the FDIC losses from failed bank sales in recent years. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to 
analyze the US banking market reactions to FDIC auctions of failed banks over the global financial 
crisis.  
Our paper is also related to the literature that looks at impact of government interventions on 
banking competition (Berger and Roman, 2015, Berger at al., 2016) as the FDIC acts as the 
receiver of the failed banks and tends to subsidize the acquiring banks to complete the transactions 
by discounting failed banks’ assets (Cowan and Salotti, 2015). Moreover, our paper contributes to 
the literature on horizontal mergers. The literature typically finds that rivals of acquisition targets 
earn positive abnormal returns. Various hypotheses are tested to explain positive intra-industry 
revaluations. The acquisition probability hypothesis predicts a spill-over associated with an 
increased probability of takeover (Akhigbe and Madura, 1999; Song and Walkling, 2000). The 
studies testing the collusion hypothesis, however, fails to find the evidence that horizontal mergers 
eliminate competitors and facilitate collusion among the remaining firms (Eckbo, 1983, 1985, 
1992; Eckbo and Wier, 1985; Stillman, 1983; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Jones et al., (2012), 
on the other hand, find evidence that opacity is an alternative explanation for positive intra-industry 
effects surrounding bank merger announcements. Our study contributes to this strand of literature 
by examining horizontal mergers in a different economic setting when the allocation of banking 
assets is inefficient during a systemic crisis (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007).  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 provides the research 
background and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology 
used in the study. Empirical results for intra-industry effects of FDIC auctions are reported in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Institutional background and research hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional background 
When a deposit-taking institution in the US is on the verge of failing, its primary regulator will 
contact the FDIC to gather its financial information and review the performance of its asset 
portfolio. In doing so, the FDIC estimates the losses in each asset category and sets the reservation 
value for the following sale of the assets of the failing institution. During the recent financial crisis, 
the FDIC typically chose the purchase and assumption transaction (P&A) as the resolution method. 
Only a handful of failed banks were unable to be auctioned to a healthy acquirer, in which case, 
these banks were closed down and the FDIC subsequently paid all of the failed institution’s 
depositors up to the limit of insurance coverage.  
After the FDIC has all the information for resolution and the failing bank is still critically 
undercapitalized, the primary regulator sets a confidential scheduled closing date and appoints the 
FDIC as the receiver to formally start the resolution process by contacting qualified potential 
bidders.1 Approved bidders then sign confidentiality agreements prior to obtaining an information 
package, which includes valuations of loans and other items on the balance sheet and operational 
information. Bidders are also granted access to conduct on-site inspections as a part of the due 
diligence. P&A transactions are sealed bid first price auction. All approved bidders simultaneously 
submit one or more sealed bids to the FDIC twelve to fifteen days before the scheduled closure. 
Each bid comprise three parts: the price for the deposits, the bid on assets, and whether the bidder 
intends to bid on all deposits or only insured deposits. Bidders sometimes also indicate whether 
the FDIC needs to enter into a loss-share agreement (LSA). The LSA was introduced in 1991 and 
rarely used before 2008. Such agreement requires the FDIC to absorb a portion of the loss on a 
                                                          
1 Insured depository institutions contact the FDIC to express interest in acquiring financial institutions and indicate the size range of institutions 
and geographic area(s) that interests them. The list of potential bidders is reviewed by the financial regulatory authorities concerned, including the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the appropriate state banking authority. 
specified pool of assets. The FDIC evaluates all submitted bids and awards the failed bank to the 
highest bidder if the total amount of the FDIC’s expected expenditures is the least costly to the 
deposit insurance fund of all possible methods for resolving the failed institution. The FDIC then 
issues a press releases about the closure of the institution and the details of the P&A transaction, 
usually on a Friday.2 The winning bidder reopens the bank on the next business day, and the 
customers of the failed institution automatically become customers of the acquiring bank with 
access to their insured funds. 
 
      2.2. Research hypotheses 
Negative bank-specific events such as bank failures can give rise to industry contagion 
(Kaufman, 1994; Aharony and Swary, 1983). As announcements of FDIC P&A auctions in the 
midst of a financial crisis indicate a deteriorating economic condition, surviving banks may 
perceive that each failure in their market increases their own overall probability of insolvency. As 
a result, rival banks’ shareholders will react negatively to these announcements. We first 
hypothesize this as follows:  
H1. Failure Probability Hypothesis: Rival banks lose stockholder value as a result of an 
increased probability of bank failure. 
Second, banking literature states that, in general, contagion arises from the propagation of 
asymmetric information when investors cannot distinguish between bank-specific and systematic 
events (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Bank-specific contagion occurs when information about one 
                                                          
2 See Appendix I for a sample press release. 
or more banks affects other banks that share common characteristics with the failing institution(s), 
for instance, their size, location and markets served. This type of contagion is sometimes referred 
to as information-based contagion and is viewed as a rational response (Gorton, 1985; Chari and 
Jagannathan, 1988). A number of empirical studies measure the adverse effects on equity returns 
of other banks associated with the failure of the initially affected bank(s) and find consistent 
evidence that return contagion occurs only for banks in the same market or product area, and 
shocks do not spill-over to other banks randomly (Aharony and Swary, 1996; Bessler and Nohel, 
2000; Akhigbe and Madura, 2001; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010; Halstead et al., 
2004). A more benign view of information-based contagion in banking is that opacity fosters 
conditions that also lead to price contagion. This is because banks are relatively more opaque than 
industrial firms (Morgan, 2002). There is also evidence that banks became more opaque during 
the global financial crisis, and so opaque assets were more difficult to revalue - market participants 
found it challenging to ascertain their true intrinsic value (Flannery et al., 2013). Jones et al., (2012) 
further point out that opacity makes it more likely that even informed investors will use bank-
specific information to influence the valuations of other banks. They find evidence that banks with 
larger investments in opaque assets benefitted more from intra-industry revaluations associated 
with announcements of mergers in the period 2000–2006. These non-merger banks, however, also 
experienced the largest price declines during the subsequent 2007–2008 financial crisis. Based on 
their findings, all else being equal, one would expect that the contagion effects to be more 
important for banks that are more opaque. We, therefore, formulate our second hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2. Opacity Hypothesis: Non-merger banks experience adverse stockholder value changes due 
to the revaluation of their opaque assets during the crisis. 
Third, P&A transactions may have an impact on market competition, which then explains 
rivals’ abnormal stock performance. Studies find that P&A acquirers generally tend to be better 
performing and hence potentially more competitive than other non-merger banks during the crisis 
(Granja et al., 2017). Evidence also shows that regulatory interventions have unintended effects 
on banking competition. For example, Gropp et al. (2011) find that competitors of bailed out banks 
in OECD countries become more risk-taking. Calderon and Schaeck (2012) use a dataset from 124 
countries and find that government interventions (blanket guarantees, liquidity support, 
recapitalizations, and nationalizations) increase competition in the banking systems. Moreover, 
Berger and Roman (2015) find that Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) recipient banks 
received competitive advantages. Extant studies on FDIC auctions tend to suggest that significant 
wealth is transferred from the FDIC to the acquirers in P&As (James and Wier, 1987; Bertin et al., 
1989; Baibirer et al., 1992; Cochran et al., 1995; Zhang, 1997; Cowan and Salotti, 2015). Such 
wealth transfers may therefore place rival banks at a competitive disadvantage and lead to a 
decrease of their market value. 
A contrasting view would suggest, however, that bank failures and subsequent acquisitions 
reduce the number of competitors in the market, which may lead to higher market concentration 
and generate monopoly rents according to the traditional collusion argument (Stigler, 1964). P&A 
transactions are indeed subject to the same regulation as regular takeovers due to potential 
anticompetitive effects.3 All market participants, acquirers and their rivals, consequently, may 
boost their profits from a P&A due to a lessening of competition and increased market prices 
                                                          
3 Section 18(c)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act prohibits the FDIC from approving any merger (including P&A transactions) whose effect 
in any section of the country may be to substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or in any manner restrain trade.  
(Prager and Hannan, 1998; Degryse and Ongena, 2008; Hankir et al., 2011). We summarize our 
next hypotheses as follows: 
H3a. Competition Distortion Hypothesis: Negative abnormal returns for rival banks are the 
consequence of competitive effects. 
H3b. Competition Distortion Hypothesis: Positive abnormal returns for rival banks are the 
consequence of anticompetitive effects. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We obtain data with the terms and characteristics of each FDIC P&A transaction from the 
FDIC. From 2008 to 2013, the FDIC acted as receiver for 489 commercial and saving banks and 
successfully auctioned 463 institutions in total. We exclude the remaining 26 transactions where 
the FDIC was unable to find a buyer and liquidated the bank. The FDIC Summary of Deposits 
(SOD) database provides information on the geographic distribution of failed banks’ branch 
networks to identify their banking markets. In this study, we define the relevant banking market at 
the level of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). MSA is a geographic unit defined by the U.S. 
Census Bureau that consists of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities, 
that comprises one or more counties. This banking market definition is supported by the bulk of 
the empirical banking literature (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002; Kwast et al., 1997; Dick, 2006, 
2007, 2008; Berger et al., 2014; Dagher and Kazimov, 2015; Goetz et al., 2016) as well as by US 
regulators.4 Overall, in our sample, 9111 branches of failed banks located in 221 MSAs were taken 
over as a part of the FDIC P&A transactions between 2008 and 2013.5 Stock market data for 
publically listed rival banks are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database to calculate abnormal returns around P&A announcements. Data on bank financial 
characteristics are derived from Call Reports of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) and S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
 
3.2 Event study 
Computing the cumulative abnormal returns of the non-merger rival banks captures the intra-
industry effects associated with P&A announcements. We estimate the expected returns using the 
market model where the market index is the daily value-weighted CRSP index. The estimation 
period for the market model coefficients and standard errors is 255 trading days long. The 
estimation period ends 91 trading days before the P&A announcement to avoid contaminating the 
estimates with stock-price reactions to earlier events. Abnormal returns are prediction errors from 
the market model and cumulative abnormal returns are sums of abnormal returns across selected 
consecutive trading days (event windows).  We follow Cowan and Salotti (2015) and define the 
event window in this study as the announcement date plus one, and two trading days after the 
announcement (CAR[0,+1] and CAR[0,+2]), since it can be reasonably assumed that the market 
cannot make an ex ante predictions about the bidding outcomes owing to the FDIC’s strict 
                                                          
4 For example, antitrust analysis of bank mergers in the US has relied on the definition of market at the geographically local level, by assuming 
that this is representative of how most households and businesses behave when they purchase banking services (Dick, 2008) 
5 In our study, only 293 out of total 9404 branches of failed banks were located in non-MSA rural areas that are excluded from our sample. 
confidentiality policy agreed by all FDIC approved bidders (Cowan and Salotti, 2015).6 It is also 
worth noting that using a relatively short event window avoids the possibility of overlapping event 
windows since bank failures took place frequently during our sample period. To test whether a 
mean CAR is different from zero, we use the standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. 
(1991) as well as substitute a cross-sectional standard deviation for the default time series standard 
deviation in non-standardized t-statistic computations. 
 
3.3 Cross-sectional analysis 
For the second stage of our analysis, to examine the determinants of the rivals’ abnormal 
returns, we run OLS regressions using cross-sectional data (incorporating a vector of bank-level 
and deal-specific characteristics). The model we use is as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
[1] 
 
The dependent variable of Equation (1)—CAR, denotes the non-merger bank’s abnormal 
returns. PROB tests our Failure Probability Hypothesis, that is, on average, every P&A 
announcement is an indication and perceived by rival banks that overall banking market health 
deteriorates and the probability of their own failures increases. We construct the variable 
                                                          
6 This assumption is testable by examining whether significant CAR can be detected prior to the announcements, for example within an event 
window of two working days before the announcement date (namely [-2,-1]). Our tests suggest that there are no significant abnormal returns that 
can be detected before the announcement, the choice of the event windows in this study, therefore, is appropriate. 
Occurrence that measures the scale of bank failures in terms of branch closures inside one specific 
MSA where the failed bank operates within a 12-month period (including the failed bank’s 
branches). This measure uses the number of branches auctioned or closed due to bank failures to 
indicate the economic condition and is then weighted by the non-merger rival’s deposits inside the 
MSA. We expect a positive relationship between negative value contagion and adverse market 
conditions faced by rival banks.   
OPAC, on the other hand, tests the Opacity Hypothesis, namely, whether the contagion effects 
are driven by the revaluation of banks’ opaque assets. We follow Jones et al., (2012) to measure 
rival banks’ opacity. We introduce three proxies to indicate rival’s opacity. Variable Real estate 
loans indicates the amount of commercial and residential real estate loans and leases a rival bank 
holds. Other loans measures a rival’s total loans except its real estate loans, whereas variable Other 
opaque assets includes all other opaque assets such as trading assets, fixed assets, intangible assets. 
These variables are quarter end prior to the P&A announcements and weighted by total assets. We 
then interact a dummy variable Crisis with these three proxies for opacity to test whether rival 
banks lose shareholder value owing to the corrections in opaque asset valuations over the crisis 
period (Jones et al., 2012). The dummy variable Crisis equals 1 if the year the P&A transaction is 
announced by the FDIC is 2008 or 2009, and 0 if the year is during 2010 and 2013.7 
COMP tests the Competition Distortion Hypothesis, namely that P&A transactions may alter 
market competitive conditions in opposite directions (H3a vs H3b). To test the competitive effects 
(H3a), we first directly measure the acquiring bank’s competitiveness prior to the P&A auction 
using the Boone indicator, which considers that competition improves the performance of efficient 
                                                          
7 We follow Berger and Bouwman (2013), which define Q3:2007-Q4:2009 as the crisis period.  
firms and weakens the performance of inefficient ones (Boone, 2008). We follow Boone et al. 
(2005) and Schaeck and Čihák (2010) to regress a bank’s profitability on marginal costs 
approximated by the ratio of average variable costs to total income to calculate the Boone 
indicator. This indicator is used because it has superior features compared to other commonly used 
proxies for competitiveness. For example, it does not require restrictive assumptions, made by the 
H-Statistic, about the market existing in long-run equilibrium, nor does it suffer from the product 
substitutability problem of the Lerner index (Schaeck and Čihák, 2014). Overall, we hypothesize 
that the possibility of increased competition due to the acquirer’s competitiveness can adversely 
impact its rivals. We next use a proxy to measure the possible effect of government interventions 
on competition, namely, the FDIC subsidies transferred to the acquirers as a result of P&A 
transactions. We collect data on FDIC cost, which is based on the FDIC’s own estimates of 
immediate and discounted future costs to the deposit insurance fund (DIF) due to the bank failure, 
and is published in P&A press releases (the failed-bank announcement). A higher FDIC cost 
suggests that more wealth is transferred to the acquiring bank (Cowan and Salotti, 2015). A similar 
proxy of pre-merger regulatory interventions, a dummy variable aTARP, is used to capture whether 
the acquiring bank received TARP support prior to the P&As. We obtain TARP transaction 
information for the period October 2008 to December 2010 from the Treasure’s website.8 As these 
interventions may have given the recipients (from FDIC subsidies as well as TARP support) 
competitive advantages, we presume a negative relationship between these benefits received by 
the acquirer and rival’s shareholder value. 
To test whether FDIC auctions of failed banks to healthy banks result in anticompetitive 
behavior in the market (H3b), we first obtain the FDIC’s own estimates of the increased deposit 
                                                          
8 https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx 
market concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index, HHI) at the MSA level where the failed bank 
has a branch network for each P&A transaction.9 It is assumed that deposit concentration is the 
proxy for local market competition with a higher HHI indicating more potential collusion among 
market participants and less competition (Scott and Dunkelberg, 2010). We calculate the 
percentage change in the HHI (%ΔHHI) in our analysis (whether due to fewer banks or an 
acquiring bank increasing market share after each P&A transaction) representing a change in local 
market competition. Thus, the %ΔHHI should relate positively to non-merger banks’ abnormal 
returns. Moreover, we use two variables to measure whether the acquirer pursues value-enhancing 
geographical and product-focused acquisition strategies. Focused mergers may increase 
local/product market concentration significantly and have a positive measured effect on the profits 
of the other firms in the affected markets (Berger and Humphrey, 1993). Geographic focus is a 
dummy variable to show whether the acquirer's headquarter is in the same state as the failed bank. 
Product focus is a Herfindahl-Hirschman index that is determined by differences in asset 
composition between winner and target (namely, the sum of the squared differences in asset 
composition between bidder and target) as proposed by Jones et al. (2012).  
We then include a plethora of variables (CONT) in our multivariate analysis to control for deal 
and bidder specific characteristics. Assets sold and Deposits assumed  indicate how much assets 
and deposits of the failed bank (weighted by the failed bank’s total assets) are transferred to the 
acquiring bank and these serve as proxies for risk of the failed bank’s asset portfolio and its 
franchise value, respectively (Cowan and Salotti, 2015). During the financial crisis, the FDIC often 
entered a loss-sharing agreement (LSA) with the acquiring bank to share losses from selected 
commercial loans, residential mortgages and consumer loans. The inclusion of an LSA is intended 
                                                          
9 The estimates are obtained from the FDIC’s The Pro Forma (HHI) Report 
to encourage bidders to bid for failed banks, so as to allay concerns regarding the potential future 
losses from the acquired assets. LSA assets are a failed bank’s assets covered by LSA weighted by 
its total assets at the time of P&A. Bid amount, on the other hand, is the ratio between the dollar 
bid to deposits assumed, which indicates an acquiring bank’s willingness to win the P&A auction. 
We also control for acquiring banks’ Size, Tier 1 capital ratio, Liquidity ratio as well as whether 
it is a bank holding company (BHC) and whether rival banks received TARP support prior to the 
P&As (rTARP) following Granja et al. (2017), Berger and Roman (2015) and Berger et al. (2019). 
Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by various sample subgroups we conduct a 
further three subsample analyses. The size of an acquiring bank can impact the competition within 
a market. First we follow Berger and Roman (2015) and split the acquiring banks according to 
their size (aSize) into three different classes: small banks (aSize ≤ $1 billion), medium banks ($1 
billion < aSize < $3 billion) and large banks (aSize ≥ $3 billion) and re-run our regression analysis. 
Next, we regroup our sample according to deposit market concentration, measured via HHI at the 
MSA level, as markets with different concentration levels may experience varying competition 
effects. We follow the Department of Justice guidelines on market concentration for the 
breakdown: un-concentrated (HHI ≤ 1,000), moderately concentrated (1,000 < HHI ≤ 1,800), and 
highly concentrated (HHI > 1,800). Finally, to examine whether our results are more significant 
during the crisis period, we drop the dummy variable Crisis used to interact with three variables 
for opacity in our main estimation and run the estimation based on two time periods: crisis period 
(2008-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2013). 
All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix II. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. On 
average, around a half of acquirers take over a failed bank that is located in the same state and also 
receive TARP support from the US government prior to the P&A transactions. As noted in the 
literature, acquirers appear to be good performing and competitive. Non-merger rival banks, on 
the other hand, tend to hold the majority of their opaque assets in the form of real estate loans 
during our sample period. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Empirical results  
Table 2 shows the event study results for the full sample and six sub-samples between 2008 and 
2013. In total, we observe 4455 stock valuations for non-merger rival banks upon the P&A 
announcements. Around the announcement date, rival banks experience a mean -0.45% two-day 
CAR (-0.33% three-day CAR), which is statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
negative CAR seems to be driven mainly by the P&A transactions between 2008 and 2009. Even 
though 2010 witnessed the highest number of bank failures since the 1990s in the US, the sub-
sample for 2010 does not appear to observe significant CAR, which may be because banks that 
failed during this year were much smaller than those that failed previously during the crisis 
(FDIC, 2011).10 While our event study results are consistent with extant bank failure literature 
(e.g. Swary, 1986; Aharony and Swary, 1996; Akhigbe and Madura, 2001) which finds negative 
stock reactions in general for the surviving rivals of the failed banks, the bank industry effects of 
                                                          
10 The banks that failed in 2010 had mean total assets of USD$92.1 billion, a decrease of 45.7% from the USD$169.7 billion in assets of the banks 
that failed in 2009. 
failures during the last financial crisis seem to be reduced compared to the size of the effects 
obtained in previous studies.11  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 shows a further analysis of the rival banks’ CAR: based on rivals’ opaque assets, 
acquirers’ competitiveness, FDIC subsidies, merger strategies and market concentration as well as 
market economic condition, the rivals are classified into a number of categories. In Panel A of 
Table 3, rival banks’ CAR are ranked into quartiles based on the percent of opaque assets (real 
estate loans, other loans and other opaque assets) held by these banks. Then the mean and standard 
deviation of the rivals’ CAR are computed for each quartile. We find that while the mean CAR 
differences between the most opaque rivals and the least ones appear significant for all three 
proxies of opacity, only the amount of real estate loans is negatively related to the level of value 
changes as we expect. This shows that the stock market casts doubts about the true value of rival 
banks’ real estate loans, but continues to positively revalue their other opaque assets. In Panel B, 
we examine whether acquirer’s pre-merger competitiveness measured by the Boone indicator 
affects the CAR of rival banks. Both quartiles of the most competitive and least acquirers are 
negatively associated with stock value reaction, but P&A transactions with the least competitive 
acquirers tend to generate more significantly negative CAR. This result suggests evidence that 
rival bank shareholders tend to react more negatively when an uncompetitive bank increases its 
                                                          
11 For example, Akhigbe and Madura (2001) find a significant mean -1.13% two-day CAR for a sample of rival banks headquartered in the state 
of the failing banks between 1980 and 1996.  
market share. Next, we rank the rivals based on how much FDIC subsidies (FDIC cost as proxy) 
are transferred to the acquiring banks. We find that there are significant differences of mean CAR 
at the 1% level between the highest FDIC estimated cost quartile and the lowest cost quartile. In 
other words, rival banks experience negative stock value effects when the FDIC claims higher 
costs to its deposit insurance fund, potentially resulting from subsidizing the winners of the P&A 
auctions. We then divide rivals’ CAR in Panel D based on whether the P&A transaction is 
geographically focused or diversified and how product-focused the transaction is. The results show 
that negative CAR are more likely to be associated with geographic-focused and product 
diversified transactions. Finally, we rank the rival banks’ CAR into quartiles based on how likely 
the banking market experiences bank failures in Panel E. The results show that rival banks in the 
MSAs with the worst economic condition (namely, the highest number of bank failures) have a 
mean CAR of -0.6% compared to 0.5% respectively for the markets where bank failures are least 
likely to occur. The mean differences between these two quartiles of CAR of -1.1% are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 reports the results of a more robust cross-sectional analysis where non-merger rival 
banks’ two-day CAR are the dependent variable. First, we run the OLS regressions with all 
explanatory variables, then we drop Product focus to conduct the estimations again as we 
encounter a large number of missing value from this variable. 
Overall, we find strong and consistent evidence to support the Failure Probability Hypothesis. 
Variable Occurrence, that captures market economic condition, has negative coefficients at the 
1% level in all estimations, suggesting that each P&A announcement is perceived by shareholders 
of rival banks as having an increased probability of failure in the future. This result, therefore, 
confirms intra-industry contagion (Kaufman, 1994; Aharony and Swary, 1983). As demonstrated 
in Table 4, we again find that rival banks’ opaque assets are priced differently by stockholders. 
While the coefficients of Real estate loans*Crisis are significantly negative in all six estimations, 
the variables Other loans and Other opaque assets are significantly and positively related to CAR 
during the crisis period in most of our estimations. This result, therefore, supports our Opacity 
Hypothesis to the extent that rival banks’ shareholders continue to correct the value of the real 
estate loans after the housing market crash in 2007, and is consistent with Jones et al., (2012).  
We also find some evidence to support the Competition Distortion Hypothesis. Both FDIC 
cost, a proxy for FDIC subsidies received by the acquirers, and aTARP, that indicates whether the 
acquiring bank receives TARP support prior to the P&As, have a negative and significant 
relationship with rival’s shareholder value. This finding confirms competitive effects (H3a) 
brought out by the regulatory interventions prior to and during the failures of banking firms and is 
consistent with existing studies (Gropp et al., 2011; Calderon and Schaeck, 2012; Berger and 
Roman, 2015). The competitiveness of the acquiring bank (Boone indicator) is, on the other hand, 
not significantly related to the rival’s CAR. The estimated increased deposit market concentration 
(%ΔHHI) at the MSA level where the failed bank operates does not appear to lead to more antitrust 
behavior in our analysis. Acquirer’ product focus/diversification strategy measured by Product 
focus, nevertheless, has consistent and negative coefficients and indicates anticompetitive effects 
in certain product markets that benefit rival banks (H3b). This finding is thus consistent with Jones 
et al. (2012) and Berger and Humphrey (1993).  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 also shows that two variables that control for acquirer’ total assets and target’s sold 
assets (namely, aSize and Asset sold respectively) have inconsistent coefficients when the variable 
Product focus is included or not in the estimation. To alleviate the concern that certain subgroups 
of our sample might be spuriously responsible for our results, we conduct further subsample 
analyses by grouping banks and deals according to several characteristics. First we group acquiring 
banks according to their size (aSize), namely small banks (aSize ≤ $1 billion), medium banks ($1 
billion < aSize < $3 billion) and large banks (aSize ≥ $3 billion), and rerun our analysis. Table 5 
Panel A shows regression estimates for these three subsamples. Overall, the results are stronger 
for the medium and large acquirers. The results for the large acquirers are qualitatively similar to 
our main findings, whereas the results for the medium-sized acquiring banks are somewhat mixed. 
Second, we split our sample according to deposit market concentration, measured via HHI at the 
MSA level: unconcentrated (HHI ≤ 1,000), moderately concentrated (1,000 < HHI ≤ 1,800), and 
highly concentrated (HHI > 1,800). Our results for the three subsamples (Table 5 Panel B) suggest 
that rival banks’ shareholders tend to experience more value losses when bank failures take place 
in moderately concentrated markets. We also find some weak evidence that in the highly 
concentrated markets, further consolidation results in potential anticompetitive effects. Finally, we 
drop the dummy variable Crisis used to interact with three variables for opacity in our main 
estimation and run the estimation based on two categories: crisis period (2008-2009) and post-
crisis period (2010-2013). Table 5 Panel C shows that main results continue to hold for the crisis 
subsample. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The findings of this study also appear generally robust. The results from our additional analysis 
of the rival banks’ CAR (based on rivals’ opaque assets, acquirers’ competitiveness, FDIC 
subsidies, merger strategies and market concentration, as well as market economic conditions) 
show that each explanatory variable in its own right has significant explanatory power and is 
overall consistent with the results from our cross-sectional analyses. Moreover, the test results of 
joint significance of all explanatory variables (F-value) show that the estimated coefficients are 
jointly significantly different from zero for all cross-sectional estimations suggesting our 
regression models are significant.  
 
5. Conclusions  
During the recent global financial crisis, the US banking regulator, the FDIC, carried out a large 
number of P&A transactions involving auctioning failed banks to healthy acquirers. We examine 
whether these transactions have any unintended effects on market competitors between 2008 and 
2013. We find that non-merger rival banks of the failed banks experience significantly negative 
two-day stock returns of -0.45% when P&A auction results are announced. We next find strong 
evidence to support the Failure Probability Hypothesis. P&A announcements are perceived by 
shareholders of rival banks as an indicator of further deteriorating economic condition and 
therefore increased probability of their own failure. Further analyses also support our Opacity 
Hypothesis as these adverse stock returns are related to the opacity of rival banks and more 
specifically the value of their real estate loans during the crisis period. Moreover, we also find 
evidence to support our Competition Distortion Hypothesis that is the FDIC resolution approach, 
similar to previous regulatory interventions, distorts banking market competition. Acquirers as 
TARP participants as well as receiving FDIC subsidies allows them a competitive advantage over 
rival banks. Acquiring failed banks, on the other hand, may increase product market concentration, 
in which case anticompetitive effects can benefit all market participants including the rival non-
merger banks. In the sub-sample analyses, we group P&A transactions according to several 
characteristics that could further explain our results on competition. We find that rival banks’ share 
price respond to the P&A announcements more when medium and large-sized acquirers are 
involved, in moderately concentrated markets, and during the crisis period. Overall, our results 
suggest that P&A auctions of failed banks have an adverse impact on stockholders of rival banks 
and also they distort competition. From a policy perspective, further research is needed to examine 
whether the benefits of enhanced bank stability in local markets outweigh the costs linked to the 
less competitive environment. As we only focus on a sample of publicly listed rival banks, more 
work is also needed to scrutinize the in-market effects of these regulatory interventions on a 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Explanatory variable N Mean Median Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Occurrence 9050 0.010 0.001 0.027 0 0.218 
Real estate loans 9012 0.411 0.402 0.146 0.034 0.856 
Other loans 9012 0.222 0.102 0.102 0 0.752 
Other opaque assets 9012 0.139 0.110 0.107 0 0.597 
Boone indicator 8402 -0.024 -0.007 0.304 -4.839 0.803 
FDIC cost 9059 0.210 0.168 0.336 0 3.700 
aTARP 9059 0.403 0 0.490 0 1 
%ΔHHI 9059 0.379% 0 0.021 0 48.331% 
Geographic focus 9059 0.606 1 0.488 0 1 
Product focus 6767 0.073 0.046 0.080 0.001 0.643 
aTier 1 capital ratio 8402 0.145 0.120 0.092 0.067 1.002 
aSize 8402 15.661 15.014 2.505 9.564 21.044 
aLiquidity ratio 8402 0.235 0.216 0.113 0.008 0.685 
aBHC 9059 0.858 1 0.349 0 1 
rTARP 9059 0.725 1 0.447 0 1 
Assets sold 9059 0.889 1 0.242 0.025 1 
Deposits assumed 9059 0.999 1 0.029 0.500 1.528 
LSA assets 9059 0.457 0.642 0.359 0 1 

















Table 2: Market reactions to FDIC auctions of failed banks, 2008-2013: an event study 
This table summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of banking firms, excluding the acquirers, in the same banking markets as the 
failed banks surrounding the announcements of FDIC purchase and assumption auction results between 2008 and 2013. The return generating 
model used to compute abnormal returns utilizes the market model. The value-weighted CRSP index is used as the market proxy. The standardized 
cross-sectional statistic (StdCesct) is adjusted for cross-sectional correlation (Boehmer et al., 1991). CsectErr, on the other hand, substitutes a cross-
sectional standard deviation for the default time series standard deviation in non-standardized t-statistic computations. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
  
No. of P&A 
transactions No. of CAR 
Event 
window Mean CAR Positive:Negative Std Csect Z CsectErr t 
Total sample 397 4455 [0, +1] -0.45% 2041:2414 -6.242*** -5.832*** 
   [0, +2] -0.33% 2127:2328 -2.187*** -2.060*** 
        
Sub samples        
Jan 2008 - Dec 2008 55 810 [0, +1] -1.05% 369:441 -2.582*** -3.224*** 
   [0, +2] -0.74% 381:429  -0.487 -1.878** 
        
Jan 2009 - Dec 2009 79 903 [0, +1] -0.58% 565:753 -2.613*** -2.694*** 
   [0, +2] -0.93% 558:760 -3.499*** -3.246*** 
        
Jan 2010 - Dec 2010 121 1090 [0, +1] -0.16% 566:524 -0.322 -1.122 
      [0, +2] 0.05% 577:513 1.459* 0.332 
        
Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 76 869 [0, +1] -0.54% 351:518 -6.975*** -6.351*** 
   [0, +2] -0.28% 398:471 -2.515*** -2.457*** 
        
Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 44 501 [0, +1] 0.08% 256:245 0.745 1.098 
   [0, +2] 0.28% 277:224 1.951** 2.904*** 
        
Jan 2013 - Dec 2013 22 282 [0, +1] -0.42% 114:168 -2.261*** -3.194*** 
   [0, +2] -0.52% 128:154 -2.487*** -3.284*** 






















Table 3: Analysis of cumulative abnormal returns of non-merger banks 2008-2013 
This table examines the effects of various variables on the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0, +1]) of banking firms, excluding the acquirers, 
in the same banking markets as the failed banks surrounding the announcements of FDIC purchase and assumption (P&A) auction results between 
2008 and 2013. Panel A shows summary statistics for the CAR sorted by quartiles based on the percentage of opaque assets (real estate loans, other 
loans and other opaque assets respectively) held by the non-merger banks and mean differences between the first and fourth quartiles of CAR. Panel 
B reports summary statistics for the CAR sorted by quartiles based on the competitiveness of the acquirers (measured by the Boone indicator) and 
mean differences between the first and fourth quartiles of CAR. Panel C displays summary statistics for the CAR sorted by quartiles based on the 
subsidies paid to the acquirers by the FDIC (measured by FDIC estimated bank failure costs to its deposit insurance fund) and mean differences 
between the first and fourth quartiles of CAR. Panel D shows summary statistics for the CAR sorted based on the geographic focus of the P&A 
transactions (measured by the dummy variable whether the acquirer's headquarter is in the same state as the failed bank). Panel D also divides CAR 
into four quartiles based on the product focus of the transaction and mean difference between the first and fourth quartiles of CAR. Panel E reports 
summary statistics for the CAR sorted by quartiles at each auction announcement based on the number of branches auctioned or closed due to bank 
failures in the previous year in the MSA and mean-comparison test results between the first and fourth quartiles of CAR.  
 
  Quartile 
Number of 
valuations Mean CAR  
Standard 
deviation 
Panel A: rival banks' opaque assets   
Most real estate loans 1 2168 -0.008 0.081 
 2 2217 -0.005 0.050 
 3 2124 0.002 0.049 
Least real estate loans 4 2248 0.005 0.063 
   -0.013***  
     
Most other loans 1 2226 0.001 0.054 
 2 2135 -0.004 0.039 
 3 2238 0.003 0.067 
Least other loans 4 2158 -0.008 0.080 
   0.009***  
     
Most other opaque assets 1 2124 0.008 0.070 
 2 2238 -0.002 0.058 
 3 2191 -0.004 0.056 
Least other opaque assets 4 2204 -0.008 0.064 
     0.015***   
 
Panel B: acquirers' competitiveness    
Most competitive acquiring banks - Boone indicator 1 2098 -0.005 0.046 
 2 2232 0.018 0.075 
 3 1816 -0.011 0.060 
Least competitive acquiring banks - Boone indicator 4 2036 -0.011 0.060 
      0.006***   
Panel C: FDIC subsidies to the acquirers   
Highest FDIC estimated bank failure costs 1 2131 -0.011 0.074 
 2 2200 -0.009 0.063 
 3 2203 0.002 0.061 
Lowest FDIC estimated bank failure costs 4 2246 0.011 0.046 




Panel D: focused vs diversified transactions  
Geographically focused 5378 -0.007 0.059 
Geographically diversified 3402 0.006 0.067 
   -0.013***  
     
Most product focused 1 1874 -0.003 0.055 
 2 1453 -0.008 0.059 
 3 1630 0.000 0.061 
Least product focused 4 1677 -0.013 0.055 
      0.010***   
 
Panel E: occurrence of bank failures in the MSA  
Most likely to occur 1 2142 -0.006 0.074 
 2 2246 -0.005 0.056 
 3 2219 -0.001 0.052 
Least likely to occur 4 2172 0.005 0.065 









































Table 4: Impact of FDIC auctions of failed banks 2008-2013: cross-sectional analysis 
This table examines what determines the magnitude of non-merger banks’ abnormal returns using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
banks’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,+1]) surrounding auction outcome announcements between 2008 and 2013. All variables are defined 
in Appendix II. *, ** and *** show statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] 
       
Occurrence -0.0643** -0.0918*** -0.1438*** -0.1018*** -0.1166*** -0.1209*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0329) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0322) 
Real estate loans*Crisis -0.0143*** -0.0450*** -0.0413*** -0.0251*** -0.0325*** -0.0356*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0039) (0.0115) (0.0118) 
Other loans*Crisis 0.0423*** 0.0071 0.0161 0.0361*** 0.0228* 0.0198 
 (0.0082) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0069) (0.0136) (0.0140) 
Other opaque 
assets*Crisis 
0.0341*** -0.0081 -0.0117 0.0831*** 0.0687*** 0.0609*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0069) (0.0148) (0.0151) 
Boone indicator 0.0013 0.0004 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0003 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
FDIC cost -0.0324*** -0.0502*** -0.0481*** -0.0159*** -0.0157*** -0.0182*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0073) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0039) 
aTARP -0.0033** -0.0026 0.0021 -0.0047*** -0.0038*** -0.0013 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
%ΔHHI -0.0382 -0.0347 -0.0962 -0.0601* -0.0679** -0.0545 
 (0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0634) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0389) 
Geographic focus 0.0003 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0013 0.0005 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
Product focus -0.0486*** -0.0420*** -0.0377***    
 (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0124)    
aTier 1 capital ratio -0.0103 -0.0044 -0.0176* 0.0072 0.0065 -0.0089 
 (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0099) 
aSize -0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0013*** 0.0011** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
aLiquidity ratio 0.0318*** 0.0261*** 0.0365*** -0.0008 0.0041 0.0134* 
 (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0075) 
aBHC 0.0037 0.0007 0.0019 0.0052** 0.0026 0.0039 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0029) 
rTARP -0.0015 0.0004 0.0022 -0.0053*** -0.0010 0.0011 
 (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
Asset sold -0.0064* -0.0011 -0.0095** 0.0137*** 0.0160*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0036) 
Deposit assumed -0.0231 -0.0039 0.0325 -0.0156 0.0040 0.0234 
 (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0246) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0234) 
LSA assets 0.0009 0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0169*** -0.0074*** -0.0122*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
Bid amount -0.0423* -0.0668*** -0.0459* -0.0125 -0.0205** 0.0029 
 (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0250) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0131) 
Year dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
MSA dummy No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Observations 6,445 6,445 6,445 8,119 8,119 8,119 
R-squared 0.023 0.034 0.101 0.075 0.086 0.129 









Table 5: Effect of P&A auctions on rival banks: subsample analysis 
This table shows additional subsample tests for analysing the impact of failed bank auctions on non-merger rival banks in the market. Panel A 
reports OLS regression estimates for subsamples with different sizes of acquiring banks: small size (aSize ≤ $1 billion), medium size ($1 billion < 
aSize < $3 billion) and large size (aSize ≥ $3 billion). Panel B presents regression results for auctions taking place in markets with different local 
concentration: unconcentrated (HHI ≤ 1,000), moderately concentrated (1,000 < HHI ≤ 1,800), and highly concentrated (HHI > 1,800). Panel C 
show results for P&A transactions occurring in crisis period (2008-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2013) respectively.  
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Small Acquirers Medium Acquirers Large Acquirers 
Variables CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] 
       
Occurrence -0.0208 0.1219* -0.0176 -0.0146 -0.2485*** -0.2352*** 
 (0.0751) (0.0727) (0.0522) (0.0499) (0.0474) (0.0454) 
Real estate loans*Crisis -0.0449 -0.0151 -0.1042*** -0.0758*** -0.0242 -0.0539*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0257) (0.0294) (0.0257) (0.0190) (0.0151) 
Other loans*Crisis 0.0081 0.0364 -0.0891** -0.0859*** 0.0415* 0.0049 
 (0.0309) (0.0296) (0.0348) (0.0309) (0.0228) (0.0180) 
Other opaque 
assets*Crisis 
-0.0426 -0.0018 -0.1013*** -0.1016*** 0.0132 0.0649*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0335) (0.0390) (0.0342) (0.0247) (0.0191) 
Boone indicator 0.0052** 0.0048** -0.1433** -0.1039* 0.0460 0.0833* 
 (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0586) (0.0547) (0.0607) (0.0482) 
FDIC cost -0.0118 -0.0115 -0.0776*** -0.0135** -0.0979*** -0.1032*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0264) (0.0054) (0.0134) (0.0113) 
aTARP 0.0015 0.0039 0.0021 -0.0036 0.0071** -0.0036 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0026) 
%ΔHHI 0.2857 0.3593* -2.7931** -2.6002** -0.2360 -0.0677 
 (0.2079) (0.2173) (1.2531) (1.1707) (0.2112) (0.0516) 
Geographic focus -0.0017 -0.0104** -0.0127** -0.0133*** 0.0147*** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Product focus 0.0318  0.0089  -0.0279  
 (0.0321)  (0.0224)  (0.0256)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,810 1,948 1,788 1,965 2,847 4,206 
R-squared 0.123 0.129 0.145 0.132 0.220 0.252 



























 Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 HHI ≤ 1000 1000 < HHI ≤ 1800 HHI > 1800 
Variables CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] 
       
Occurrence -0.1794*** -0.1463*** -0.2938*** -0.2752*** 0.1490** 0.1125 
 (0.0415) (0.0434) (0.0624) (0.0597) (0.0739) (0.0760) 
Real estate loans*Crisis -0.0306 -0.0324 -0.0868*** -0.0650*** -0.0177 -0.0330* 
 (0.0225) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0168) (0.0211) (0.0184) 
Other loans*Crisis -0.0262 -0.0204 0.0122 0.0202 0.0445 0.0257 
 (0.0269) (0.0255) (0.0237) (0.0193) (0.0300) (0.0254) 
Other opaque 
assets*Crisis 
-0.0551* 0.0158 -0.0230 0.0652*** 0.0082 0.0154 
 (0.0299) (0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0209) (0.0304) (0.0257) 
Boone indicator 0.0147 -0.0145 0.0014 0.0002 0.0431 0.0141 
 (0.0513) (0.0552) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0703) (0.0617) 
FDIC cost -0.0240 -0.0142** -0.0444*** -0.0257*** -0.0580* -0.0232** 
 (0.0170) (0.0069) (0.0092) (0.0052) (0.0343) (0.0103) 
aTARP 0.0037 -0.0033 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0038 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0050) (0.0040) 
%ΔHHI -0.3409 0.0533 -0.1521** -0.1064** 10.6013 0.7794** 
 (0.3560) (0.2517) (0.0693) (0.0414) (6.6621) (0.3137) 
Geographic focus -0.0040 -0.0064 0.0073** 0.0031 0.0091** 0.0048 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0038) 
Product focus -0.0693***  -0.0237  -0.0466*  
 (0.0217)  (0.0197)  (0.0277)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 2,246 2,710 3,457 4,491 742 918 
R-squared 0.150 0.107 0.131 0.177 0.324 0.362 


































Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Crisis 2008-09 Post-crisis 2010-13 
Variables CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] 
     
Occurrence -0.2204*** -0.1556*** -0.0799** -0.0809** 
 (0.0599) (0.0524) (0.0343) (0.0338) 
Real estate loans -0.0344* -0.0424*** 0.0261*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0153) (0.0082) (0.0079) 
Other loans 0.0223 0.0073 0.0175* 0.0178** 
 (0.0229) (0.0183) (0.0092) (0.0089) 
Other opaque assets -0.0129 0.0423** 0.0112 0.0132 
 (0.0256) (0.0198) (0.0111) (0.0108) 
Boone indicator -0.0628*** -0.0407* 0.0014 0.0014 
 (0.0234) (0.0226) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
FDIC cost -0.0837*** -0.0162*** 0.0153 0.0022 
 (0.0164) (0.0058) (0.0122) (0.0104) 
aTARP -0.0028 -0.0031 0.0036** 0.0015 
 (0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
%ΔHHI 0.0577 -0.0823 -0.0758 -0.0355 
 (0.3137) (0.0579) (0.0617) (0.0607) 
Geographic focus -0.0005 0.0097** -0.0040* -0.0049** 
 (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Product focus -0.1531***  -0.0150  
 (0.0384)  (0.0107)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,444 3,921 3,989 4,185 
R-squared 0.159 0.171 0.083 0.083 
F-value 3.73*** 4.47*** 2.19*** 2.21*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
